An examination and evaluation of physical force as a
tool for resisting oppressive authority.
Introduction
“What is authority?”
The response to my question is almost instantaneous. “Authority is the power one has to get other
people to do things.” After briefly
digesting this response from my fellow student, I answer him with four words.
“What kind of things?” The student
begins to furrow his brow in contemplation.
After a few seconds, he replies “People with authority get other people
to do things they want to have done.”
“Why?” I ask. “What gives one
person or a group of people the ability to get other people to do things for
them?” At this point, I can hear and see
my colleague’s frustration beginning to mount.
“They have authority. If you have
authority, you get to tell others what to do.
Plus, it’s not like these people are being forced to do bad things. The things these people do almost always
benefit a large number of people, including themselves.” Almost as soon as he finishes, I ask “So how
does someone get authority?” “Well, it
depends. At work you get authority by
being promoted by your bosses, but in politics we choose the people we want to
have authority.” “Okay” I respond. “But what if I believe my boss’s decision is
unjust or I do not support any of the candidates running for office? Do I still have to abide by the decisions
that are made in these cases? What about
the laws and guidelines that are made as a result of these decisions?” This question seems to probe my colleague a
bit too much. Looking directly at me
with a slightly reddened face, my fellow student exclaims “Yes, you do! You may not like it, but that’s tough shit!”
My fellow student’s outburst represents the majority
of responses I have received from others concerning authority and one’s duty to
obey it. Rarely have I been given a
justification for the legitimacy of the authority one person or a group of
people have over others. Instead, most
replies to my inquiries constitute explanations of what authority is, what
types of people have it and how authority is used by people who have it. When attempts are made to provide some sort
of justification, the arguments utilized usually state something to the effect
of “Authority should be followed or obeyed because it is authoritative and one
has to follow or obey that which is authoritative.” The apparent difficulty that exists in
establishing the legitimacy of authority, then, poses a tremendous ethical
problem for a civilization that relies so heavily on authority as a means for
maintaining both its functionality and material prosperity. That being said, the difficulty people may
have in establishing an ethical and philosophical foundation upon which
authority is legitimate does not thereby entail that authority is illegitimate.
The difficulty people encounter in justifying authority can thus stem from varied
interpretations amongst and between people of what authority actually means.
In my experience as a worker, college student and
young adult, I have come across authority in two different forms. One type of authority concerns the ability a
person has to gain voluntary consent from others based on the knowledge or
expertise they have demonstrated towards a goal that involves others. A second type of authority involves an
exercise of power by one person towards or over another person in order to gain
that person’s compliance for or towards the achievement of some goal. Unfortunately, the authority most seem to
recognize and refer to in their arguments is of the second type. If this is indeed the case, then I can
understand why such difficulty exists for those who would wish to make
assertions either defending or legitimizing such a phenomenon. In order to defend this kind of authority,
one must accept the reduction of another person’s capability to formulate their
own moral agency. For this reason, it is
my belief that one who encounters this type of authority is under no obligation
to obey the commands or instructions given from the person or people possessing
it.
If one is under no obligation to obey the
instructions of the person or people possessing this type of authority, then to
what or whom does one owe an obligation of obedience? One problem inherent in providing an answer
to this dilemma is that the response is manifested in the question itself. Why is it presupposed that some sort of
authority archetype exists and why is it presupposed that such an archetype (if
it exists) produces some sort of obligation for one to obey? After all, a
person’s lack of obligation to obey one type of authority does not necessarily
entail the existence of a conflicting obligation of obedience to another type
of authority. If human beings can be
viewed as possessing the capacity to ruminate over issues of right and wrong,
then it would seem that one’s rumination should be the point of enquiry as
opposed to the outcome of one’s rumination.
Consequently, I feel it is necessary to demonstrate how my own
consideration of ethics has led me to resist oppressive authority while
simultaneously searching for an ideal way to order, manage and regulate the
affairs of my life. Whether fortunately
or unfortunately, one of the primary tools of resistance I have had access to
is violence. Considering how awash the
world is in violent struggle of all kinds, it seems most appropriate to conduct
an analysis of just what can be gained (or not gained) by those who utilize
violence against authority and whether violent tactics are ultimately an
ethical form of resistance to the oppression frequently perpetrated against
certain groups of people by those in power.
Violence as Liberation from Oppressive Authority
Although much of American society recoils at the
notion of physical force as a legitimate tactic for voicing one’s dissent, I
believe such a reaction often fails to incorporate an element of empathy that
is necessary to understanding why someone would strike with negative intentions
towards another. Those who denounce
violence as a viable form of protest must remember that violence in such cases
constitutes a reaction against perceived wrongs rather than a statement of
presumed right. One who commits violence
against people, figures or institutions possessing authority, then, views the
first blow as already having been landed by the target of their efforts. Alexander Berkman embodied this viewpoint
when providing explanations and justifications for his attempted assassination
of Carnegie Steel Company chairman Henry Clay Frick in 1892. Speaking on the assassination attempt itself,
Berkman declared that “[I]t would strike terror into the soul of his [Frick’s]
class… Their strangling hold on labor might be loosened. Only for a while, no doubt. But that much would be gained, due to the act
of the Attentater [performer of the deed]” (16). While such a statement may help to explain
the mindset of one who elects to utilize physical force as their primary means
of protest, it fails to explain the thought process emanating from one’s mind
when they actually apply violence to a given situation. In other words, such a statement fails to
answer the question “Why violence?”
That being said, providing an articulate explanation
of what is largely a physical action may be misguided or even unnecessary. After all, the application of violence from
one person to another carries with it an assumption of understanding between
the parties involved in a dispute by the party who acts as initiator (which is
due to the initiator’s perception that a previous wrong or series of wrongs has
already been perpetrated against them by the other party). This assumption is summed up by the monster in
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, who defends the actions he has taken against his
creator by saying “There was none among the myriads of men that existed who
would pity or assist me; and should I feel kindness towards my enemies? No:
from that moment I declared everlasting war against the species, and, more than
all, against him who had formed me and sent me forth to this insupportable
misery” (125). It is this sense of
visceral immediacy that would seem to grant physical force its persuasive power
over the downtrodden. By physically
lashing out, one who feels oppressed by the authority of another reminds that
person (or group of people) that they are a completely human being. Perhaps more significantly, an act of
violence reminds one’s self that they are a completely human being. The physical exertion necessary to carry the
act out, for example, makes use of one’s body parts in ways reminiscent of a
time before oppression had taken place.
From a psychological perspective, violence stimulates a reassertion of
selfhood in the individual propagating the deed, as one who is able to strike
out against the people, figures or institutions oppressing them reaffirms their
capacity to broach (rather than simply observe) life circumstances. As Col. Jean V. Dubois frankly states in the
novel Starship Troopers “Violence has settled more issues in history than has
any other factor” (Heinlein 26).
Once the initial confrontation between an individual
and their oppressive situation has occurred, the potential exists for this
situation to be altered. Hence, the
application of physical force against oppressive forms of authority is capable
of providing a visible and concrete outcome for the individual that chooses to
utilize it. Furthermore, any gains
achieved through the use of physical force serve to renew the purpose of the
person applying the force. In other
words, any successful strike against oppressive authority that one carries out
reasserts the validity of one’s selfhood.
Even in situations where an oppressed person’s use of physical force is
blunted by a greater application of physical force (from the person or people
wielding oppressive authority), one’s recollection of previous tangible gains
achieved through this method revitalizes one’s desire to resist. In the words of author Russell Hoban “There
are situations in life to which the only satisfactory response is a physically
violent one. If you don't make that response, you continually relive the
unresolved situation over and over in your life” (“Famous Quotes about
Violence”). A person’s motivation to
physically fight against undesirable circumstances supported by those holding
and making use of oppressive authority can also be reinforced by the
possibility of “catastrophic success.”
Once one commits themselves to the use of violence for achieving
liberation from oppression, there is technically no limit to the strength and
scale of violence one can commit.
Consequently, there is always the possibility that one single act of
force can completely negate the capacity of those in authority to carry out
oppressive actions.
It should be noted that the likelihood of such a
result occurring is often irrelevant to the person adopting physical force as
their primary mode of resisting authority.
The mere possibility that one can immediately and conclusively put an
end to their suffering serves to constantly reinforce one’s belief in the
appropriateness of utilizing physical force and the moral legitimacy of
escaping oppression. Additionally, the
possibility of obtaining “catastrophic success” allows users of physical
violence to strengthen the empathy that is shared between themselves and other
members of an oppressed group. When one
mentions the possibility of immediately and permanently doing away with a set of
oppressive circumstances to a multitude that is suffering as a result of said
circumstances, the visualization of liberation is no longer an internal
phenomenon restricted to the thoughts and feelings of a single person. In fact, one’s visualization of liberation is
no longer a phenomenon; liberation from oppression becomes endowed with
distinct characteristics that reflect the motivations and desires of an entire
group of oppressed people. Thus, the
goal of liberation becomes more salient than ever and an oppressed group’s
ability to resist oppression thrust onto them by those possessing authority is
stronger than ever (as a result of individuals within the group striving harder
than ever to reach a clearly defined and foreseeable goal).
Despite the immediate, powerful and tangible
benefits one can derive from the adoption of physical force and its application
to oppressive conditions, there are several shortcomings inherent in this form
of protest that mute and may ultimately outweigh the gains that can be (or
actually are) achieved. The most
pressing concern I have with the use of violence as a means for challenging
oppressive authority is that there exists the potential for (what is initially)
an action of liberation to turn into an action carried out by the very
authority one is trying to resist. As
Tolstoy points out in his work The Kingdom of God is within You “To injure
another, because he has injured us, even with the aim of overcoming evil, is
doubling the harm for him and for oneself; it is begetting, or at least setting
free and inciting, that evil spirit which we would wish to drive out”
(21). Whenever one elects to use force
against another person (or group of people), a fine line must be distinguished
between ridding oneself of that person’s power over them and then following up
that removal by filling the ensuing void with one’s own power. In other words, a person’s use of physical
force should not serve as a platform from which their own views on the
structuring and ordering of a given society can be projected onto others. The problem one encounters in making such a
statement, however, is that the projection of one’s physical energies onto
another person presupposes (at least to a certain extent) a simultaneous
projection of personal views.
Such an occurrence is most obvious in scenarios
where the use of physical force has been transformed from a mechanism of
defense into the driving force behind one’s actions. When one embraces violence as a form of defense
against perceived wrongs committed by those in power, the desired outcome of
one’s actions is necessarily vague when applied to society as a whole, as
liberation consists of the ability one has to do and live as they please. Provided one’s lifestyle does not (or does not
seek) to intrude upon and or restrict the capacity of others to live and do as
they please, the particulars of how one chooses to live their life are largely
irrelevant when one confronts oppressive authority. Instead, it is one’s potential to decide how
those particulars will order themselves (i.e. one’s capacity to possess full
responsibility for making decisions that are personally impactful or
significant) that is important. Once one
reaches the status of a fully functioning moral agent (a status that has been
denied to them by those possessing authority), the lifestyles and personal
actions of others should not exert any sort of influence on how one elects to
lead their own life (as one is now free to order their personal affairs and
priorities in a way conducive to their own beliefs and customs).
When violence is utilized as an offensive action,
the influence of other peoples’ lifestyles and personal preferences becomes a
source of great discomfort to the one who would (or in fact does) apply violence
in the advancement of their own cause.
This change in one’s perspective towards the likings and behaviors of
others usually occurs because a desire for authority exists that was previously
lacking. A desire for authority in this
case is not necessarily tantamount to a desire to rule over and monitor the
actions and behaviors of others (as is often the case for those in authority
who an oppressed person or group of people find themselves fighting
against). Instead, a desire for
authority emerges as a tool through which a currently oppressed person or group
of people can more fully protect themselves and their personal interests. In order to more fully protect oneself and
their interests in this manner, however, a person or group of people must
project their own values and beliefs onto the persons or people in authority
they are currently fighting against.
Hence, Voltairine de Cleyre observes that “To admit violence is to admit
the State” (Avrich 42). If such a
projection of values and beliefs fails to take place, then one cannot assume
authority in society. After all, the
persons or people currently in power attained their status through the
projection of their values and beliefs onto others. Furthermore, those currently possessing
authority in a given society are set to defend their power via the use of
coercive techniques, meaning that the person or people who have adopted
violence as their primary strategy for achieving liberation from oppression
must now use violence to subdue others and therefore become a mirror image of
the person or people they seek to escape from.
It is also worth noting that once an oppressed
person selects physical force as their main mode of operation against those in
authority, they have decided to engage in confrontation at a near permanent
disadvantage to themselves. This
disadvantage is not one that is limited to the gathering and mobilization of
resources. Those currently possessing
authority in a given society not only possess a greater capacity for physical
force, but also greater control over how a confrontation between themselves and
dissenting factions can be characterized to those not actively involved in any
part of the conflict. In fact, it is the
galvanizing of public support against those who physically express their
dissatisfaction that grants the person or people in authority a capacity to
utilize their superior resources. Noam Chomsky notes that “The more you can
increase fear of drugs and crime, welfare mothers, immigrants and aliens, the
more you control all the people” (“Noam Chomsky Quotes”). Once those in authority begin to direct their
capacity for force against the person or group of people actively engaged in
rebellion, the violence of those who are oppressed actually begins to invert
itself and become a liability rather than a means of escape.
This development occurs for one main reason. The alienation that an oppressed person or
group of people feels in relation to their own way of life (which is largely,
but not exclusively, an internal phenomenon) becomes transformed into
alienation between themselves and most others in society (which is largely, but
not exclusively, an external phenomenon).
Whereas previously an oppressed person or people were alone to the
extent that they (unlike other persons or people in society) were not permitted
to exercise the full extent of their abilities as moral agents, currently they
are alone because the rest of society has ceased to view that person or people
as moral agents entirely. Consequently,
the person or people engaging in violence against those holding authority in
society are viewed as immoral agents and not fully human beings. This in turn means that there is not much of
a limit to the types of repressive measures those in authority can initiate against
a rebellious person or people or the extent to which such measures can be
carried out. As Theodor W. Adorno
reveals, “Domination delegates the physical violence on which it rests to the
dominated” (“Wisdom Quotes”). For every
successful act of violence utilized by an oppressed person or people against
those possessing authority in society, the potential (and support of other
people in society) exists for a retaliatory response that is several times
worse.
Conclusion
At this point in time, it appears that one would
have to take a firm stance one way or the other regarding the legitimacy of
physical force as a means through which an oppressed person or group of people
can resist and perhaps liberate themselves from circumstances perpetuated by
those possessing authority in a given society.
I believe, however, that allowing oneself to set forth a concrete
resolution either for or against the use of violence is ethically
unconstructive because it places the owner of such a statement into a position
from which they can assign simplified classifications to the actions of
others. Furthermore, one who decides
that violence either absolutely is or is not an acceptable method of rebellion
against unjust authority would seem to have to understand other peoples’ views
(as well as their sufferings and struggles) in relation to how well those views
comply with their own, meaning that the empathy necessary to understanding how
someone else’s views can differ from one’s own (and still be valid) would be
lacking. If one unabashedly condemns
violence as an illegitimate tool of resistance against oppressive authority,
for example, then they would also seem to reduce the moral agency of those who
engage in violent activity in an effort to achieve their liberation from oppressive
circumstances. After all, if violence is
deemed by someone as being an absolutely insufficient ethical response to
oppressive conditions, then it follows that those who utilize violent activity
as their primary means for changing oppressive circumstances are absolutely
ethically insufficient themselves (as long as they continue to use
violence). Not surprisingly then, a
person or group of people who applies physical force against an oppressive
authority can only become ethical via their adoption of another person’s views
about how one should resist oppression.
Making an absolute decision that either endorses or
rejects violence as an appropriate form of protest against oppression thus
reveals an authoritarian impulse in one’s evaluation process that duplicates
the very authority that one who is oppressed wishes to break free from. In order to avoid potentially unleashing such
an impulse onto another person, one must start off the evaluation process
recognizing the moral agency of every person they come into contact with
(regardless of whether this contact is physical, solely audio or solely
visual). By recognizing the moral agency
of every person we come into contact with, we simultaneously recognize the validity
of every person to reach whatever conclusion they happen to reach pertaining to
physical force and its application against oppressive authority. That being said, our recognition of another
person’s capacity to formulate views on violence against oppressive authority
that differ (sometimes dramatically) from our own never entails acceptance of
another person’s view as ethically valid.
It does, however, entail that differences between people on ethical
matters do not equate to differences in humanity between people. After all, it is through recognition of the
differences between our own life and someone else’s that potential exists for
an understanding to be made and peace achieved.
Works Cited
Avrich, Paul.
An American Anarchist: The Life of Voltairine de Cleyre. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1978. Print.
Berkman, Alexander.
“The Jail.” Life of an Anarchist:
The Alexander Berkman Reader.
Ed. Gene Fellner. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005. 13-32.
Print.
“Famous
Quotes about Violence.” Book of Famous
Quotes. Haythum R. Khalid, n.d. Web.
13
Nov. 2012.
Heinlein, Robert A.
Starship Troopers. New York: Ace
Books, 1987. Print.
“Noam Chomsky Quotes.” Brainy Quote.
Brainy Quote, n.d. Web. 13 Nov. 2012.
Shelley, Mary.
Frankenstein. New York: Bantam
Dell, 1981. Print.
Tolstoy, Leo.
The Kingdom of God is Within You.
Sydney: Accessible Publishing Systems PTY
Ltd., 2008. Print.
“Theodor Adorno Quotes.” Wisdom Quotes. Jone Lewis, n.d. Web.
13 Nov. 2012.
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